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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
DORIS V\THITE BAGLEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
and Cross-Appellant,
vs.
SOCONY MOBIL OIL COMP ANY,
INC., a N mv York corporation,
Defendant-Appellant,
and Cross-Respondent.

Case No.
11444

RESPONDENT'S AND
CROSS-A PPELLAN'l1'S BRII~F
S'l1 A '1 l~MENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
1

This is a suit by lessor claiming lessee has improperly held over on a service station lease as a result of
lessee's failure to renew for which lessor claims lessee
should be liable for treble damages. Lessor further
claims that the lessee has breached the lease during its
period of exist(•nce.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOvVER COURT
Because of the extensive nature of the pleadings,
tlwir importance to this appeal, their complicated nature and in view of the fact that two different summary
judgments have been rendered in the lower court, which
snmmar~· j11dg-m0nts are the sole issues on this appeal,
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the pleadings will be set forth in detail with an indication of their disposition. The plaintiff's initial complaint
set forth two causes of action. The first cause of action
alleged that the plaintiff considered the options to renew, which were contained in the lease, as continuing
offers and that she had revoked said offers and that
therefore the options to renew could not be validl>·
exercised by the lessee. The second cause of action
sounded in fraud, claiming that there had been a material
misrepresentation which had motivated the original
lessor to enter into the lease. Lessor then filed a fin;t
amended complaint (R. 27). This first amended complaint incorporated the first two causes of action of the
original complaint hy reference and set forth a third
cause of action claiming that the lessee had improperly
charged lessor hy withholding rent payments for improvements made on the premises. Lessor claimed that
the lessee should actually he resonsible for paying for
those improvt>ments. A fourth cause of action was also
included allt>ging that the lessee had trespassed on proprrt>- adjacent to that JH'OJWrty which was demist>d in
the lease. .Jndge Ellett granted summary judgment in
behalf of the defendant on tlw plaintiff's first and sPcond
camws of action (R. 72). 1'lw plaintiff's third cause of
action was dismissed with prejudice by stipulation (R.
81). A propost>d sC'cond amended complaint was filefl
(R. 82) with a motion to allow tlw filing of the second
amend<>d complaint (R. 97), hut the mattt>r was nPY<'I'
considPrE'd h~· tlw eourt and no order was entE'rPd allm,·ing the filing of th<> proposP<l se('on<l anwnded complaint.

A rnotion to allo"· th<> fi I ing of a third amended
complaint was filed (R. 98) and an order was entered
allowing the filing of tht> third anwnded complaint (R.
~l9). The third am<c'ndud complaint (R. 101) listed as
tlH· first thr<'P ca11ses of action those ·which had been
dispmwd of prnviom.:1:-·. A fonrth canse of action claim<'d that thPl'P had bPen a material alteration of tlw lease
ll\" tlw lPsse(' which had voided the lease. 'rhP complaint
s• t torth a fifth cansP of action ·which alleged that the
l('~;c.:<<', : ;oron:-· ::\Iohil Oil, Inc., had assigned the lease
:u1d (1,.: ;-;11el1 thP assigneP, E. r..:;. T<Try, \\·as the only party
1d10 eonld n'll\'Y1" the leasv and that Mobil Oil Company'~
attempt to do ::-;o '':as inYalid. 'I'h<• ca11s<'s of action allPgPd treble damages for wrongfully holding over. 'rhe
complaint contained a sixth cause of action alleging that
the lPssee had contracted not to renew the lease by implied contract and estop1wl and claimed treble damages
["or wrongfully holding over. The seventh cause of action of said complaint claimed that Mobil Oil Company
was wrongfnll.\· occupying the building upon the premises
dPmis<'d for the reason that the building was not demised
"·ith the }ffPmis('S and that the 1Psse0 was not paying
additional reasonahh~ rental for the building. An eighth
carnw of action allPged a trespass in that it claimed that
tlH:' lessPP was occupying 742 square feet of adjacent
prn1wrt:-· lwlonging to the kssor and not demist>d in the
l«mw. A ninth cansP of action claimed that the lessee
h:· occ111J>·ing more pro1wrty than was dPmisPd in the
IPasP hrPacli0d. tlw lPasP and that the 10asP was therPfon, s11h.i<'d to frrmination. A tenth carn;p of action
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alleged lack of mutuality for the reason that the lease
purports to bind the lessor for a potential period of 25
years while it allows the lessee the right to terminate
upon giving 30 days' notice and that the additional burdens imposed by the alteration were also indicative of a
lack of mutuality. An eleventh cause of action alleged
an implied covenant in the lease for the lessor and lPssee
to mutually share profits eminating from the 01wration
of the station.
Judge Hanson granted a summary judgment (R
187) in favor of the plaintiff on her third amendPd complaint on the sixth cause of action, the eighth cause of
action, the tenth cause of action and the eleventh cause
of action as to the question of liability and reservPd the
question of damages for trial. In the same judgment
Judge Hanson granted a summary judgment in favor of
the defrndant on the sevPnth cause of action.
In the pretrial order (R. 194) Judge Croft entered
a judgment denying trPhle damages. A judgment (R.
213) was granted in favor of the plaintiff in the amonnt
of $7,517.00. Tlw findings of fact (R. 212) contain a
mistake in tlw first paragraph. In that paragraph
$280.00 lH'r month shonld read $180.00 per month.

Tlw plaintiff-respondent and cross-appellant agr<'t'S
with thP ch·frndant-appl'llant and eross-respondent's
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statement of facts in the mam as far as it goes. She
disagrees with certain pertinent aspects of that fact
statement. Plaintiff entered into one not two written
lease agre(_•ments (Exhibit P-1). The other document
·which ·was denominated as a lease (Plaintiff's deposition
Exhibit No. 2) was a summary of the primary lease for
n'cording purposes and did not in any way add or detract from the terms of the lease (Plaintiff's Exhibit
Xo. 1)
TlwrP is no evidence in tlw record to the effect that
th' <11qn·ovPnwnts on tlw property wen-' not completed

until May 1, 1955.
1'Jw lease with respect to termination provided as

follows:

"7. Lessee may use the demised premises
for the dispensing of petroleum products and for
the conduct of a service station business thereon
and for any other lawful purpose. In the event
of the condPmnation of said premises or any part
thereof, or in the event the full use of said premises or any portion thereof in the conduct of a
su1wr service station business is interfered 'vith
or handicapped by any law, ordinance, or rule or
ret,rulation of any governmental office or body
acting under authority or cover of authority, or
b~- order of any court, lessee may at its option
terminate this lrase upon 30 days' written notice
to the lessor. It is also agreed that in the event
at any tinw or from time to time the demised
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premises cease to be advantageous in the sole
discretion of the lessee for the dispensing of petroleum products, then lessee may at its option
terminate this lease upon thirty (30) days' written notice to lessor and paying to lessor an
amount equal to that received by lessor as rental
for calendar month next preceding the month in
which notice of termination is given. The waiver
of any provision hereof shall not be deemed a
waiver of any other provision or provisions hereof, or of lessee's right to subsequently terminate
this lease because of the occurrence of one or
more of the conditions or circumstances herein
set forth."
At the time the lease was executed each paragraph
was stamped with an initial stamp in black i;nk and
initialed by Lavine H. White in her own behalf and by
B. F. Ball for and in behalf of the lessee. The lease at
the time it was so executed provided in paragraph 20
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1):
"Lessee agrees to supervise the construction
and installation of a service station upon the demised premises including buildings and equipment in accordance with plans and specifications
first approved in writing by both parties, ... "
At a later date the lessee unilaterally added paragraph 24 which does not bear the initials of Lavine H.
White and which bears a different initial stamp (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1) and which paragraph is quoted as
follows:
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"24. K otwithstanding tlw provisions of paragraph 20 a hove, lessor agre<·s to canse to be construetPd on tlw demisPd lH"<•mises impron•ments
and faciliti<>s and <"quipment adequate for the operation of a gasoline sPrvice station for tlw sale
of gasoline and otlwr iwtroleum iirodncts at a
co::;t of arlproximately twenty thousand dollars
( $20,000.00), said amount to he in addition to
l<>ss<•<>\ contribution outlined in paragraph 20
above. l n tlw <'VPnt lPssor is unable to complete
<"Onstruc-tion of im1n·ov<•Jll<•11ts within nindy (90
da.\·~:) after an PX<'cnted copy of this lease is deliYn<'d to !Pssor, it is mutually agreed that lessee
ma~·, at its option, complete construction of said
sP1Tic<· station and h" r<'imhun;ecl for such ex1wn:ws from }ll"Oceeds from the loan to be secured
h:,· lessor and rPfrrred to in paragraph 19 above."
Paragraph 24 imposed an additional burden upon
tlw ]('Ssor which ,,·as not contPmplat('d at the time the
lPssor agreed to accept three hundred dollars ($300.00)
a month and was accepted by the lessor only subject to
tlw condition that an additional amount of compensation
lw rPcPi1·Pd in proportion to the value of the investment
mnd<> h~- tlw lessor (Deposition of Doris ·white Bagley,
pp. 19, 20). This testimony went unchallenged throughout th(~ proceedings. Promises "·ere continually made by
tlH· lPssc•p throngl10nt the iwriod of thP lease that the
lPssor would lw reimlrnrsed at some point for the imJll"OV('lll<'nbi \\·liich had lwen pnt on fop station by the
lussor (Doris \Vhite Hag!Py's deposition, pp. 1!) through
~'.2).
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On October 17, 1963, the following letter \Vas sent
to .Mrs. Doris Bagley, the lessor herein:
"Dear .Mrs. Bagley: .Management has reported on the proposal we submitted on the property
at 2950 East 33rd South, Salt Lake City, L"tah.
"As proposed with your consent, the outlim·
of the proposal vrns as follows:
"l. Firm up two five-year options to Pnah!P
you to horrow money on the leasP.
"2. Rental of l.5 cents per gallon with a
minimum of $265.00 per month. The 1.5 cenb
per gallon would be computed on an annual gallonage hasis.
"3. Mobil Oil Company to assume all maintenance.
"In factoring out the proposed rental versus
rental .Mobil is presently paying, it was felt that
the present lease arrangement should not he
changed.
''Howe\-er, they are willing to propos<:> for
consideration a firming up of two five-year options and assuming maintenance on the basis of
a rental of a flat $265.00 per month.
"I know that management has carefully ronsidered our proposal, and it would be appreciated
if yon ·would givP their recommendation your consideration.
'"Please advise me as soon as possible, as thl'
proposal is being 1wnckd until we hear from you.
Sincer<'l.'- yours, H. 0. Nichols." (R. 152).
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Tt was v<>ry clear from the record that the only basis
1111011

which Mobil would n•new the lease vvas at a lesser

rental amount.
At page 40 of the Nichols' deposition the following
statement is found:

"Q Isn't it trne then that in your conversation \\'ith Mrs. Hagle)', in regard to this letter,
that this proposal was t1w only way that 8ocony
would <kal with h<'r?
A Right."
Referring to the $265.00-per-month rental figure in the
letter at page 41 of the deposition Nichols testified as
follows:

"Q In other words, this is based, back to our
c·onversation, is that was all she was going to get?

A '11 hat's rig-ht."
This was Mohil's proposal that they were willing to
pay at hest $265.00 per month in order to continue in the
premises after the expiration of the initial period (R.
153 throngh 161). Mr. Nichols testified in his deposition
( R. 15-1-) as follmvs:
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"A No. This letter was presented on a basis
of what we were able to do under the present
gallonage of the station."
After receiving the H. 0. Nichols letter and after
discussions the lessor sent a letter to the lessee indicating
that she was expecting that the lessee would in fact
terminate at the end of 120 months (R. 158). Mobil knew
that it was the lessor's intention to borrow money hased
upon a further lease commitment. This is demonstrated
from page 34 of the deposition of Harold Nichols, an
agent of Mobil. He states at lines 12 through 15:

"Q Now let's go back to the history. What
prompted this particular letter~
A Because the Whites asked us to firm up
two five-year options in order for them to borrow
1noney."
The foregoing testimony is completely inconsistent
with the statement found on page 4 of the appellant'~
brief quoted as follmvs:
"The record is without evidence to show defendant made any representations not to nnrw
the lease ... "
Appellant's statPment with respect to this fact1wl
issue as to whether or not there is evidencP in t110 rpeonl
of Mobil's expression of its intent to r0new the lPa~<'
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is contravened by the respondent in the foregoing and
the appellant's statement does not represent a fair reslrnH~ of the evidence in the record. It presents none of
the evidence favorable to the judgment and this failure
to prevent any of tllE~ evidence favorable to the respondent makes that which is presented of questionable value.
(Donqlns v. Duvall, 304 P.2d 373, 5 Utah 2d 429, (195G).)
rl'he ap1)ellant refers to the fact that plaintiff did

not n'cord in tlw record evidence to demonstrate that
slw ddrimentally relied upon the representations refrn<>d to ahoV('. In this r<>s1wct the iilaintiff admits that
tlwre are C(~rtain shortcomings in this regard, lmt <'Xrmws h('I'SPlf for two rPasons; first, the entire scope of
the discussion at the motion for summary judgment presupposed that counsel for both parties were assuming
as a fact that the loan had been secured by Doris Bagley
which ~was of a large and substantial amount beyond that
which would he paid by the current monthly rentals based
upon her assumption that she had secured a new lease
to third parties. This fact did not seem to be questioned
h~r th0 defendant and plaintiff on the basis of excusable
neglect asks the Court to accept her affidavits in this
rPgard at the presPnt time. The second reason the Court
sl1ould disn'gard any shortcoming in this connection is
that there was no prejudicial error suffered by the defendant for the reason that there is no legitimate factual
disputt~

as to whether or not the plaintiff actually secur-

ed

larger loan

t11t>

n~ferred

to and a new trial on that
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issue would most certainly result m a finding to that
effect. The record reflects that the plaintiff would hav(~
been able to secure a new lease had the premises bePn
vacated at thn end of the initial period (plaintiff's dep')!':) .
OSl·t·
10n, p. ~•)
In the plaintiff's third amended complaint in the
sixth cause of action the following paragraphs are found
(R. 107) :

"7. The plaintiff relying upon the statl>rnPnt
of the lessee did seek a new future lessee and did
obtain a commitment to rent the property for
$600.00 JWr month.
''8. That in reliance upon the statenwnts of
the defendant, the plaintiff did negotiate a loan
based upon the assurance that she would have an
income of $600.00 per month from the snbjPet
premises which income would come from the m•w
lessee who was obtained in view of the deft.ndant
Socony Mobil's represt·ntation that they wen• not
going to exPrcise their ovtion to ren(:'W the IP<U.:P.
"~. That the loan which ·was obtained did
commit the• plaintiff to make payments in exces:;
of an amount ·which she could reasonably va»
based upon the amount of income which she n·Ct>iV<'S from tlw dPf Pndanh; nnder thP pres<>llt arrang(·ll1Pnt."

11 0 this all(·gntion th<' defendant-r<'SJlOndent in its an 1\ ('l'
to plaintiff\; third amended eomplaint at page 1'.2:i ol'
the, record stated as follows:
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"5. Has insufficient information to admit or
dt:my the allegations of paragraphs 7, 8 and 9
and therefore denies the same."
The record does not contain any factual demonstration that the plaintiff ever received personally a notice
that tlw defendant vvished to exercise its option to
renew the lease and the record does not demonstrate any
fadual proof that the notice was sent to the address
lish·d in the lease. The record does not contain any
factual proof that the notice ·which was sent was sent
to an nddrt>ss at which the ddendant was residing at
the tii:ll' tlH' notiCl' l\'aS cleliH'I"Pd.
The Llt-'fendant leased the Iffemises in question to one

E. E. Terry for a period which extended longer than the
prime period under the lease (R. 61, Plaintiff's Exhibit
No. 1).

ARG-CMEN'r
POINT I
THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE OF AN IMPLIED CONTRACT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT TO THE
EFFECT THAT DEFENDANT WOULD NOT RENEW AND
EXTEND THE LEASE, AND THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE
OF CONDUCT ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT WHICH
ESTOPPED IT FROM RENEWING AND EXTENDING THE
SAME.
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The extensive statement of facts includes ample
evidence supporting the legal conclusion that an implil'd
contract existed whereby the defendant was prPvente<l
from rene~wing its lease. The case of Chandfor v. Boacli,
319 P.2d 776, Cal.App. (1968), insofar as it is in point,
actually supports the plaintiff's case more than it does
the defendant's. The issue involn'd was the proprit't~- of
instructing the jury that the novelty and correctnPss of
an idea were essential to the creation of a contract hy
implication to pay for the idea. The court held that thP
instruction was improper but in the process cited nunwrous statutory provisions of the California Code defining
implied contracts. These statutory provisions are to a
large extent a reduction of the common law to statnt<>
and are cited as follo,vs in order to rrlate them to the
case hrfore the Conrt:
The California Civil Code, Section 1619, provides as follows:

"A contract is either express or implied."
SPction 1620 providPs:
"An exprt>ss contract is one, the terms of
which ar<> stat<><l in words."
S<>etion Hi21 providPs:
"An implied-in-fact contract is one, the existencP and terms of \rhich are manifrskd by conduct.''

15
Section 1584 provides:
"Performance of the conditions of proposal,
or the acceptance of the conditions offered with a
proposal is an acceptance of the proposal."
Section 1589 provides:
"A voluntary acceptance of the benefit of a
transaction is equivalent to a consent to all the
obligations arising from it, so far as the facts are
known, or onght to be known to the person accept-

ing."

Sud ion Hi();) JH'O\'idPs:

"Any benefit conferred, or agreed to be conferred, upon the prornisor, by any other person
to which the promisor is not lawfully entitled, or
any prejudice suffered, [emphasis added] or
agreed to be snff ered, by such person, other than
such as he is at the time of consent lawfully bound
to suffer, as an inducement to the promisor, is a
good consideration for a promise."
Certainly a prejudice has been suffered within the
meaning of this code section by the plaintiff in the abovecntitled action. By definition this prejudice constitutes a
valid consideration in order to support the implied contract found hy the low<:>r conrt in the instant case.

"An existing legal obligation resting upon the
promisor, or a moral obligation originating in some
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benefit conferred upon the promisor, or prejudice
siiffered by the promisee, [emphasis added] is also
a good consideration for a promise, to an extent
corresponding with the extent of the obligation,
but no further or otherwise."
·
Likewise this provision presents a theory adequate to
support the finding of the lower court in the instant cast'.
The detrimental reliance of plaintiff herein upon th"
statement by Mobil to the_. effect that it would not renew the lease constituted sufficient consideration to imply
a contract not to do so.
In the case of Kelly v. Richards, et al., 83 P.2d 731,
95 Utah 560 (1938), at page 743 the court stated:
"This estoppel arises when one by his acts,
or admissions, or by his silence when he ought to
speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence induces another to believe facts to exist and
such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief,
so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the Pxistence of such facts. 1t consists in holding for the truth a representation act<>d upon, when the person who made it, or his 1n·ivies, seek to den:' its truth, and to deprive th(•
party ·who has acted upon it of the benefit ohtai1wd."
Both the above-qnoted section and that section of tlw
cast:' qnoh,cl in tlw defondant's brief from the same ea:-;P
d<>monstrat<• that tlw necessary ('lPments have bP0n rn<'t
hy thP plaintiff. rJ1Ju• defendant had reasonahlP grounds
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to think that lwcause of its representation the plaintiff
would change her position because of the facts stated
Parlier in this brief. First, she indicated in her deposition that slw could rent the station for more money and
that sh<~ had indicated this to the defendant. Also, in the
dPposition of l\fr. Nichols, a representative of the defendant, he stated that the reason the plaintiff wished to firm
11p the two additional five-.\Tear options was for the pnrposl' of borrowing rnom'.\T based upon the lease as security.
It would only haw been logical for the defendant's agent
to l1uw al:'.:iLlll<_'<l that npon his making a statement to
th" plaintiff to tlw dfrct that tht•y ·were not in a position
to re1ww the l<~ase 1wcansl~ of its low gallonage. that the
plaintiff would i1mnediately take steps in or<ler to secure
a new tenant and to negotiate the loan which she told the
uefendant she was going to negotiate. In the Petty v.
Gindy Manufacturing Corporation case, 404 P.2d 30, 17
Utah 2d 32 (1965), also cited by defendant, this Court
in addition to those sections cited by defendant stated the
following at page 31:
'' . . . Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts
as follows:
"A promise which the promisor [Gindy] should
expect to induce action or forbearance
of a definite and substantial character on the part
of the promisee [Petty] and which does induce
snch adion or forbearance is binding if injustice
can bP avoided only by the enforcement of the
prornisP.''
n~asonably
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The court stated that this section ·was being used hy
the court as a criterion to determine the case. In that
case the court affirrned the lo-wer court's decision denying
relief to tlw promisee and stated at page 31:
"In such circumstances we review the evidence
in the light most favorable to the findings."

In the present case the court found in favor of tht.> plaintiff and the Court in this case should likewise reiww the
evidence in the light most favorable to the findings. \\'p
·would suggest to the Conrt that the instant case }ffovid<>~
a mnch clearer case in favor of granting relief to the
promisee for the reason that equity in good conseienC!'
can onl~' clearly he served in the instant case if the plaintiff is allowed the relief prayed for, the reason being that
she was reasonably entitled to rely upon the promisP rnadP
by Mr. Nichols in his letter and in his oral statenwnts to
her to the effect that the lease would not be' renewed. 1t
·was a clearcut and concise' promise concerning a speci fie
and defined act from which the defendant would allstain,
that is, the nmewing of the contract. There can b(• mi
question that the l'Pcord accurately reflPcts the fact thal
this was indeed tlw lJosition of the dPfendant.
In th<' ]H'PS(•nt cas<• if any uncertainty (•xists ill tlw
language of the contract, the holding in Charlto11 r.
I-Jacket, :-3tJO P.2d 17fi, 1Utah2d 389 (19Gl), sltonld ht> :qlplied. In that C'ase tlw conrt held that 1\'lwn there is s1 (']1
unc<'rtaint~· in thP langna,":<' of a contract, it is the im·rogatiw of tlw trial co11rt to dd('l1llirn• tlH" in·opt'r intet·-
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pn•tation to he placPd upon th<' transaction in the light of
tlw <·,·id('nC<'; and also to dd('nnine wliether tlH~ plaintiff
aeted n•asonahly und<>r the circumstances. Here where
Own• were undisputc•d facts thC' court was well \vithin its
discn~tion in finding as it did and tlw Comt in this case
should uphold the lower court as it upheld the lower court
i11 th<' Petf:IJ case even though tlw pffect would he to give
thP prornisPe in the instant case rather than the promisor
as in 111<' P,·tfy C'ase the rPli1•f for which it pray<'<l.
TIH·re an• almost as man:· d<·f'initions of t>xpn•ss and

i111pliPd eontrads as tlt<'I'<' arP eases involving the interpretation of tlwse \rnrds. In addition to the foregoing
statutory definitions which have been cited in conjunction
with the Chandler case, the following common law definitions aT<' fn·quently quotC'd (Black's Law Dictionary, P.
''<) ;)~ )

.),

:

Contract.
"An express contract is an actual agreement

ol' the parties, the tt>rms of which are openly ut-

t<'red or deelared at the tinw of making it, being
i-;tated in distinct and explicit language, either oral1:· or in \niting." 2 BL. Comm. -143; 2 Kent, Comm.
-1::)0; Liiw 1". Rosse, 10 Ohio ±14, 36 Am Dec. 95;
A. J. rmcwr Co. v. Josc1Jh, 184 Ind. 228; 108
X.K 774, 775; 111 re Piera, Bidlcr & P1:crcc lllfg.
Co., D.C.X.Y., 231 FPd. 312, 318.
··An implied contract is one not created or evid(,llC<'d by tlw explicit agreement of the parties,
lint infrnNl liy tlH• Jim·. as a matt0r of reason and
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justice from their acts or conduct, the circnmstances surrounding the transaction making it a
reasonable, or even a necessary, assumption that
the contract existed between them by tacit understanding." ill ill er' s A ppcal, 100 Pa. 5Gi), 45 Am.
Rep. 39-±; Landon v. Kansas City Gas Comzwny,
C.C.A. Kan., 10 Fed. 2d 263, 26G; Caldwell 1_1. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 148 Ark. 474, 230 S.\V.
5GG, 568; Cameron to U sc of Cameron, v. Ey1w11,
332 Pa. 529, 3 A.2d 423, 424; American La France
Fire Eugine Co., to Use of American LaFrr111ce &
Foamite Inditstries v. Borough of Shr11r111dooh,
C.C.A. Pa., 115 Fed. 2d 8!JG, 807.
"Implied contracts are sometimes di\'id\•<l into
those 'implied in fact' and those 'implied in law,'
the former being con•red hy the definition ju:-;t
given, while the latt\•r are obligations irnposPd
on a person h.\' the law, not in pursuance of his
intention and agreement, either expressed or iniplied, bnt even against his ·will and design, becan:-;('
the circumstances lwtwePn the parties are such as
to render it jnst that the one should have a rig-Lt,
and the other a conesponding liahilit_\r, similar to
those which ·wonld arise' from a contract h(•t\n•t•n
tll<·m. This kind of obligation therefore rests on
tlH' principle that ·whatsoever it is certain a i:ian
011ght to do that the law will suppose him to kl':<'
promised to do. And hence it is said that, whil«
thP liahility of a part_\- to an express contncrt
[tris(·~~ directly from the contract, it is jnst tlH• l'<'versP 1n the cmw of a contract 'implied in bv:,'
th<' contract t]J('l'C' ]wing· impliPd or arising frn::1
tlw !in.hi lit:.'." Bliss 1'. H mtf, 70 Yt., G:14, 41 A. 10'...'.\::
Kel'ulil 'I'. Brou·11,.nrr'~ 11dm'r, '.2:11 K_\'. :108 :.!1
N. \\y. :..!<i 4;)0. 4(i:1.
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"But ohligtions of this kind are not properly
contracts at all, and should not be so denominated.
There can be no true contract without a mutual and
concnrrt>nt intention of the parties. Such obligations are more properly described as 'quasi contracts.'" Union Life Ins. Co. v. Glasscock, 270 Ky.
750, 110 S.\¥. 2d 681, 686, 114 A.L.R. 373.
'I1lw facts of this cas(~ qualify under the foregoing
ddinitions of implied contracts and support the finding
of t!JP low<'r court in that regard.
POINT II
A PROVISION IN THE LEASE GRANTING DEFENDANT THE OPTION TO TERMINATE THE LEASE UPON
GIVING 30 DAYS' NOTICE AND PAYMENT OF ONE
i;IONTH'S RENT TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER PRO\'ISIONS OF THE LEASE INCLUDING THE ADDITION OF
PARA GRAPH 24 AND THE OTHER FACTS SURROUNDING
THIS OCCURENCE CONSTITUTE LACK OF CONSIDERATION AND MUTUALITY SO AS TO RENDER THE ENTIRE
LEASE NULL AND VOID.

At first blush the Keck v. Brookfield case, 409 P.2d
:;s:3, ~ Ariz. App. 424 ( 19GG), would appear to be in point;
l1owev(·1·, there is a \·ery material element in which that
('a~e is clistingnishable from the present case. The distinguishing factor is set forth in the facts at page 584 as
fo \ \()\n-:

:
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"On June 1, 1953, J. N. Brookfidd and Hnth
Brookfield, husband and wife, and Bnstl•r Jenkins
and Dorothy Jenkins, husband and wife, l\'Ssees,
<'X<'cuted a lease agrePment with l\fr. and Mrs.
Dorris, as lessors. rrlw leaso 1vas for a one year
period ending on June 1, ] 954. It prnvided that
the $1,500.00 rent be paid in monthly installments
of $125.00 and granfrd to tl10 lessee an option
to n•1w1\' the' l\~asc~ on tlrn same terms for an additional 20-year period upon the giving of proper
notic<>. Tlw l<>asPd I>rPrnises wen• deserilwd as
·... that cPrtain ham locatPd at 2552 Orn<'I<' Road,
Pima County, Arizona.'
"On FPhrnary 26, 1954, .T. N. Brookfield,
Lester .Jenkins and the Dorrises, in each other's
presencP, signed their names in the right-hand
margin of the lease dated June 1, 1953, for the
purpose of giYing effect to the following written
addition to the instnmwnt rnadP at that tinw hy
.T. N'.Brookfield.
" ·F'<•hruary 2(i, 195-l, it is agrec"cl by all sip;natnres attachPd that this lt>ase shall run for thC'
20-yPar period stated above and that the lessees
can renJk(• said lease at the end of an:-' given year
hy gfrin~ a 30-day writt('n noticP.'"
Tlwrdon• it is se\'n that tlw option to renew in the
K rck case was PxecutPd h:--· all parties to it and became
an exeentPd ratlwr than an \'Xecutory coYenant. For this
reason th<• lnek of rnutnality, if any, wl1ich may haw
c•xisted was e01Teded.
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"Alleged defective mutuality applies only to
executory contracts and it does not apply to an
<>x<'cuted contract nor to the executed portion of a
contract." In re Titrner's Estate, 341 P.2d 376,
171 C.A. 2d, 591.
Tlw District Court's holding in the instant case related to the lack of mutuality as to the option to renew
togdlwr with other surrounding circumstances. The option to renew was exPcntory and as such could be stricken
down as larking in mutuality as to that aspect of th<:> contract.
'l'he doctrine of mutuality is closely related to the
doctrine of lark of consideration and both of these elenwnts have lwen codified in the present Uniform Com111ereial Cod<> which provides in 70A-2-302 as follows:
"UnconscionablP contract of clause. - (1) If
the court as a matter of law finds the contract or
anv clause of the contract to have been unconscionabie at the time it was made the court may refuse
to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the rernaindPr of tlw contract without tlw nnronscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any
nnconscionahlt> clansf' as to avoid any unconscionahlP r<>snlt.
''(2) ·when it is claimed or appears to the
court that the contract or any clause thereof may
lw nneonscionable the parties shall be afforded a
n•asonahle op1)0rtnnity to present evidence as to
its co111111ercial setting, purpose and effect to aid
the r011Tt in making- th<> <10t<'rmination."
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It is the position of the plaintiff that the contract
·was unconscionable at its commencement for the reason
for the wrongful adding of paragraph 24; however, the
contract was ratified h.'- its n•cognition by both parties
over a period of Yl'ars. However, this ratification only
hecanw effective as to tlw paragraph and created the contract aftPr the date the U niforrn Commercial Code became
effectin~ on DecPmher 31, 1965, and as snch it is suggested
that the provision::; of thP l:nifonn Commercial Code
should be applied to gowrn tlw instant interprdation of
the option to rPnew. In this case the entire contract must
he reviewed with n•spect to the issue of lack of mutuality
and particular attention 11rnst be given to the unilateral
addition of paragraph 24 hy the lessee. In this respect it
must be recalled that it 1rns the undisputed tPstirnony of
the plaintiff that the defendant throughout the continued
existence of the contract claimPd and re-affirmed that an
allm\-ance "-onld lw madP for the increased value of the
property as a result of the construction of the station and
a contribution of $20,000.0() made hy plaintiff's predPcessor in em1fonnity with the requireuwnts imposed hy
paragraph 2-l of the least>. rl'he addition of this paragraph
imposed a substantial additional hnrd<'n n1JOn the lessor
1d1ich was eompli(~d with h,\- the lt>ssm· suhject to the
eondition that the additional rPntals 1w pai<l. 1'his kstirnony w(·nt urnlispHt<•d and was Jll'<'Sl'nted in that context
lit>fore th<• lowe>r conrt and in viPw of tltP addition of this
clans<' an into!<•rahl<> lmrd<'n was placvd upon th<~ ks~or
and then· \'."a" iJld(•<>d a laek of imttlw.lit,\· w]H•n thl' eontrad
wac; Yi<·w<>d in its <·niird\·. 'i'lii~ r·o1Hlition of lack of
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mutuality was compounded by virtne of the facts supporting the first })Oint of tlw brief herein, that is, that there
was actually a contract not to rene·w the option. Therefor<', if an>· mutuality existed it was to the effect that
tlw contract embodied in the lease in its total contained
a el ear understanding that the ovtion to renew ·was in-

<'ff Pdin.
The plaintiff must readily agree that the mere fact
that tlw ddendant had the option to cancel the lease
upon µ:i\·ing :m da>·s' notice was insufficient in and of
itself to crt>ate a lack of mutuality so as to void the lease.
'rlwre is a small minority of cases to the contrary and
most courts construing the question have considered it a
ratlwr close one. Plaintiff basically agrees with the
assertion in this rt>gard set forth in Point II of defendna t's hrid wliert>in it cites 17 Corpus Juris Secu-ndurn,
Section 100. Mort> particularly in point is Volume 51C,
Cm'}ms J1rris 8ec1111dnrn, Section 91, quoted as follows:
"Although a lease for a term of years cannot
he terminated at the option of one of the parties
in the absence of a provision thert>of, the lease may
provide for its termination before the expiration of
the term fixed at the option of either of the parties
to the lease agreement. It has been held that
whether such an option exists, and, if it exists,
·whetlwr it may be t>xercised by either of the parti(•s, or solt~ly by the lessor, or the lessee, depends
on the krms of the particular lease. An agreement
is not invalid although it gives the lessor or the
less<>E' alonE' the right to t0nninat<> tlw lease.
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''Under Missouri law, a filling station lease
has been held not invalid for lack of mutuality, notwithtstanding the provision giving the lessee the
option to cancel the lease at any time after giving
30 days' notice to the lessor, the court holding
that the payment of the stipulated rPnt was sufficient consideration for the cancellation clause."
Bowen 1;. Shell Oil Co. (D. C. Mo.) 71 Fed. Supp.
649.
The court pointed ont that this is the majority position bnt that wherever the quPstlon has hPen constrned
it is a very close question and that the balance of the lease
provisions mnst lw inqnired into.

'l1 lw plaintiff's position stated in its simplest terms
·with respect to the issue of mutuality is that the unilateral
addition of the 24th Jmragraph imposing upon the lessor
the burden of contributing $20,000.00 to the construction
of the sPrvic<, station and the promise by the lessee that
it \vould not renew the leasP combined with repeated oral
statPments to the eff Pct that additional amounts would br
imid to tliP lessor in accordance with the reasonable valuation of the impro,·ernents of the sc'n-ice station comple't<->l>- cle:;tro:·s tlw mntnality of the agreement in view
of tlw lesseP's condnct with res1wct to all issues and
particnlarl:- in YiC'w of its failure to pay additional sums
\dwn cornhiiw<l with tl1P option to tPrrninat<'.
Th\' rnlt:on of rnntuality it; closl'l:· related to the
tli<'or:1· of ronsideration and the' smnu fad situations have
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h«Pn construed in different cases under these separate
}t(~adings. (Williston on Contracts, Y ol. 1, Sec. 501A.)
'l'his position is also set forth by James in his text Optirm Contracts, Section 117, as follows:
"A contract covering a period of time but containing the condition that it may be terminated
before that time, will remain effective for the full
term, unless the condition of termination is fully
eomplied with. \Vhere, therefore, a particular
noticl~, or a specified time, is required to make the
notice effrctivP, a notice not conforming to the
contract, or not given at the time specified, does
not have the effect of terminating the contract.
"With reference to mutuality, it would seem the rule
is that unless the option to terminate the contract
is reserved to either party, it is lacking in that essential. Thus, a contract between a railroad company and a telephone company which gives the
latter the privilege of placing telephones in two
depots, of the former, in consideration of free telephone service for it, but subject to termination at
the will of one, 'vith the stipulation that no corresponding right shall be exercisPd by the other, lacks
mutuality."

It is therefore the position of the plaintiff that although the contract itself did not lack mutuality as a
l'Psult of the option to renew for a total lease period of 25
>1•ass while the lessee could terminate at any time, the
r·ovenant allowing the option to renew was not supported
hy consideration and therefore the option itself could not
he exercised although the prime term was a valid rental
JlPriod. 11 he eases construing the issue apply to the prime
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term and do not involve tlwmselves with the question of
the validity of the option to r<>new. Cases construing the
issue which state that th(' contract does not lack mutuality as a n'snlt of the right to tPrminate on the part of the
lessee are not in point lwre because it is the plaintiff's
claim that the covenant itself lacks mutuality; therefore,
although the plaintiff admits the leasl' for the prime
term was not drstroyed h? lack of mutuality, it is suggPsted that tlw covenant for tla• option to renew is invalid
for that reason inespectiv<> of tlw other facts presrnt
in the case.
In Volume 51 C of Corpus J?tris Sccundmn, under
Landlord and Tenants, at Sections 91 and 92, it is pointed
ont that where an option does exist in the lessee to terminate the contract pursuant to notice this clause will Le
constnwd most

strongl~-

against the lessee. In smmnary

it is the position of the plaintiff that the lower conrt \\·as
corrt>ct in ruling that tlH' h'ase lacked nrntnality in view of
all tlw fadorn prPsPnt combined with the fact that it was
terminable by thP lPss<'P in :10 days and particularly that
th<> option to n•nPw was nlid lwcarnw it lack<'d nrntnality.
POINT III
THERE IS Al\IPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF AN Il\IPLIED COVENANT TO INCREASE RENTAL
OR SHARE PROFITS UNDER THE LEA.SE.
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'l'ltis point is largely a question of fact not law and
the facts to support this contention are set forth at length
in the stat('llH'nt of the facts and the legal implication of
thL'Se facts hav(~ largely heen discussed under Points I
and II. In Yiew of the addition of paragraph 24 and of the
uncontrovertcd oral represL'ntations testified to by the
plaintiff herein to the effrct that on numerous occasions
hotli hefor0 the contract was entered into and throughout
it:-; <'Xisknc0 the defrndant's agents and representatives
i11<lil'at(·d that an additional amount of rent would he paid
in aceo1·da11ee with tl1P increased Pvalnation of thP propPrty based upon the contribt:tion of the $:20,000.00 h~· the
lessor in addition to the other requirements imposed initially under the lease and in view of the increasing property Pvaluation as a result of inflation and population
increase in the area in question. The lower court would
not hav0 needed to rest its findings upon the theory of implied contract but would have been well within its discretion to have found an express covenant to the effect that
an increase in rental or a share in the profits did exist
under the contract and that the lessee had breached its
ohligation in this regard. Defendant's quote from the

Cousins case in connection with this case clearly sets forth
the applicable law with respect to implied covenants. The
plaintiff accepts it, agrees with it and suggests that it
l'l'quires that this Court affirm the lower court's holding.
'11 lw contract itself provided for a lease payment in the

amount of $300.00 l)er month and the depositions demonstrate that this was not sufficient to make the payments

30

at the bank on the $200,000.00 loan and to pay the property taxes and irnmrance on the pro1wrty in question. At
page 13 of hPr dPposition the plaintiff stah'd:

". . . $2G5.25 went to ·walker Bank to repay tlH·

loan taken out to furnish the con:struction money
to build the service station for General Petrolem1;.
It took frn years to pay off the Joan.
Q. Right. That was a loan tahn out
mother, is that correct?

h~-

yonr

A. For the construction money to build the
sernce station to put General Petroleum in business.

Q. Did you have any thing to do ·with the
Joan 1 That is, were you a signer or-

A.

No.

Q.

Strictly in your motlwr's name?

A.

YPs.

Q. X ow, what happt>ns to thP balance of that
money?

A. Tlw $3-1.75 halanc<~ was s<'nt to m~- mother
for sonw time and that wasn't <'V<'n ('nongh to pay
taxes on the propr·rt~-. So I was having tronhlr
g<>t ting· tliP tax('S 1la id, so finally all of the money
was S('nt to \Yalk('l' Bank. 'T'l1(')' sf't np a tax Pi'crow ·with this ad<litional mmwy."

1

c
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The only reasonable and logical conclusion to he drawn is
that the parties clearly intendl~d that there would he some
consideration flo\\·ing to the kssor and the only possible
profit which could haYe eminated to the lessor in con1wction ·with this transaction would have b<~en a payment
of so11w additional amount abon the $300.00. All the
mo1wy borrowed from tht> hank went into the service station construction and it was necessary for the lessor each
month to conw up with additional money sufficient to
llH'Pl tlH· insurance and property taxes as they were amortiz<'ll. l t \\'<Hild ht> 11nthinkahll' to conclude that it was the
intention of fop parfa's that the Jessel'< should pa>' a total
n'ntal pa>·ment in the amount of $300.00 per month to
thP lessor, that the lessor should take that amount, pay it
to the hank for the improvements being used by the lessee,
and pa>· additional mone~· out of her pocket each month
for taxes and insurance so the lessee could operate a
profitahlt> service station upon the leased premises and
n·tain all profits derived therefrom.

rr lS 'l'HE POSITION OF THE PLAINTIFF THAT

THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PLAINTIFF'S
FAVOR GRANTED BY JUDGE HANSON SHOULD
Bl£ UPHELD. HOW'EVER, IN THE EVENT THAT
l '11 1S REVERSED THE PLAINTIFF THEN ASKS
THAT THE COURT REVERSE JUDGE ELLETT'S
J·;~\RLil'.JR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND RELIES ON
'l'Hlj~ FOLLO"WING POINTS TO SUPPORT THAT
I 'OSI'l:'ION: PLAINTIFF SEEKS A JUDGMENT IN
lU~R FAVOR OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE A NEW
'l'HTAL ON ALL TSSeES.

32
POINT IV
THE CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN SOCONY MOBIL OIL COMP ANY AND E. E.
TERRY WAS AN ASSIGNMENT OF SOCONY MOBIL OIL
COMP ANY'S LEASEHOLD INTEREST WHICH OPPOSED
THE CONDITION THAT ONLY THE ASSIGNEE, E. E.
TERRY, COULD VALIDLY EXERCISE THE OPTION TO
RENEW.

The property which is the subject of this lawsuit was
leased to General Petroleum by Lavine IL White on Augnst 17, 1954, for a period of 120 months (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1). The defendant commenced occupancy of the
premises on May 1, 1955 (R. 60). The defendant, Socony
Mobil, leased the premises in question to one E E. Terry
for a three-year term commencing the 1st day of September, 1963, and continuing through the 31st day of Angnst, ,
1966 (R. 63, G4).
1]1e lease agn'emPnt between Mobil and Terry incorporates the dPal<:>r's contract ~which provides at paragra]Jh
11 (R G4) as follows:
"Helationship of parties. It is the intent of
the parties that dealer's statns shall be that of an
inde1wnclent business man, and that neither dealer
nor any of dealer's Prnplo~·eps shall lw employees
or a_g(•nts of l\[olii 1 . . . "
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'rhe lease does not contain any right of re-entry except
in the event of a breach of any applicable provision contained tlwrein.
There was no attempt by E. E. Terry personally or
through any person who was his agent to exercise the
option to renew which '.Vas contained in the original lease
between La\·ine "Whitt> and General Petroleum, which i8
tlw lease in question in this case. Under any view of the
fadH in thi8 case, that lease expired at the very latest
on Ma:< 1, 19115.
'l'he demise from the defendant to E. E. Terry was
for a period approximately 15 months beyond the prime
term for which Mobil held the premises. The legal effect of this transfer was an assignment by the defendant
of it8 entire leasehold interest which divested Mobil Oil
of its right to extend its lease with plaintiff herein. In
tlte case of Stewart v. Long Island Railroad Company,
102 N.Y. GOl, 8 N.E. 200, 55 Am. Rep. 844, Judge Rapallo
said:
"vVhere a lessee of land leases the same land
to a third party, the question has often arisen
whether the second lease is in legal effect an assignment of the original lease, or a mere sub-lease.
. . . The rule is well settled that if the lessee parts
with his whole term, or interest as lessee or makes
a lease for a period exceeding his whole term,
[ t~mphasis added] it will, as to the landlord,
amount to an assignment of the lease, and the es-
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snnce of tlw i1rntnnnent as an assip;nnwnt so far a~
the original lessor is co11C('l'nPd, will not lw dPstl'oyecl hy its n'S('lTing a n<'w n·11t to the assignor
with a pow<'r of r<•-entPring for non-pa~1nent."
Law to the ~mtlH' <'fi'eet is found in Tiffai1,11 ui1 Real Prop-

erty, Section 4S, pag«' 114, quotPd as follows:
"A gnrnt of the entirP inh•n•st remammg ill
tlw ksst>(' in Pitlwr the 1d10IP or part of tlH~ in·e111ises 11·ill constitute an assigmrn·nt to tlw grnntP(',
so far as the landlord is concerned, en•n though th
instnunent purported to lw a lease, or a diffrn·nt
rPnt lw n•s<•rved. .
"

A casP in point is (irotli r. Co11fi11eJ1fol Oil Cmnzmny, all
Idaho ease of 1%2 found at :37:1P.2<154S. Th<> eonrt stat('d
at ]Jag(' 550 as follm\·s:
'· ·\Yi 111 l i tll<· di s~wnt, thP gern•ral rnle S<'<'lll~
\Yell settl<•d that a transfer of a tPnant's entire in-

terest, in a part of
rnainder of tit<' t<Tm
tnnto ratlwr tlian a
th(• lamllonl and tlw

demis<•d pr<•rnises for th(' reconstitub·s an assignment pro
snhl<'as<', at least as lwhre<•11
transf<·n'<'.'

"Conoco ('Ollt,·;~{b tlwt the option to renew,
eonhti1wd in its l<'ns<' from \\'ilkic>, lw<l the cffeet
or exten<linµ; tlw 11·rrn for th· fnll 10 YPHl'S ]Wl'lllitfrd h>" tlH· tPnns of the option; tl111s it held a long·(•J'
frrn1 ilmn tliat. 1\·liich it grnn\<·d 1o \Vilk(' in tl 1<'
i<':l:-:c 11<1r·k: 1La1 i1 t11<•J' ·f'oi<' ]1old :1 n·\·ersionnn·
ini"J ••: i in tl (' l: ~'" ·-l:n!d, nn1~ i h· l1·:1~T-liack cnnl:l
no1- qi ):'r:1 t<· .~1:-' :111 ~~:::-: ·:-~LfJ!( ~1 i.
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"'l'he provision involvPd is a conditioned option, for renewal, not a covenant to extend the
term. As such it is merely an offer, and does not
convt>y to, nor invt•st in, the optionee a present
estate in the land, until it is exercised. Gard v.
Thompson, 21 Idaho 485, 123 P. 497; Cicinclli v.
Iwasaki, 170 Cal. App. 2d 58, 338 P.2d 1005; 51
C..J.S. Landlord and Tenant, ~ 54, 56. Cf. Murray
v. Odman, 1Wash.2d 481, 96 P.2d 489.
"The option in this case is limited and conditi01wd b>· the clause, 'provided Lessee exercises
t'aid option by giving LPssor writtPn notice of such
intent at k·ast GO days prior to tlw termination of
this lease.' No estate or interest in the property
could pass until the conditions of the proviso were
fnll>· complied with."
It is of no importance that Mobil Oil termed their lease
instrnnwnt to Terry a lease or sublease, for the deciding
factor is the legal relationship created by an instrument
which grants to a third party a longer term than the second 11arty holds. N eitlwr words, form, conditions or covenants prC'vented the transfer of Mobil Oil's leasehold
Pstate when, by their ovrn contract, they put a third party
into their position. In Craig v. Sitmmers, 47 Minn. 189,
40 N.\V. 742, 15 L.R.A. 236, it was held that whether or

not an assignment of a lease had been made is a question
of tlw lPgal effect and not of the form of the instrument.

In the casP of Holden v. Tidwell, 133 P. 54 (Okla.)
llH• court sta t~'s:
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"The language employed or form used by tli1:1
parties in interest does not necessarily determine
the character of the instrument or the relation ere.
ated thereby. The fact that a transfer may be in
form a sublease or that it reserves rights again~t
the transf f'rees similar to such as ordinarily reserved in a lease is, as a gf'neral rulf', immatf'rial."
American Lau: of ProzJrrty, Yolnme 1, Section 3.57,
at page 297, stat< s as follows:
1

"In determining ·whether a given transfrr is a
sublease or an assignment, the court in the majority of the cases, has said that the retention of the
reversion is necessary to the creation of the land- '
lord and tenant relation and held that the transfer
hy the lessee of his right to possession for the
duration of this tf'rm is an assignment."

By transferring the leasehold estate for a longer
period than it held, and thus not retaining a reversion, ,
Mobil Oil assigned its lease. The assignment transferred
all the interest held hy J\Johil Oil, le~wing it ·without any
privity of estate.

:3:2 American Jnrisprnrlence, Landlord and 'l1enant, '
8<,ction i\18, at page 29:~, stat<'s:
"A ](jssee dnri11g his occupancy of the demised
premises, holds both l1~T privity of estate and of
contract. "When lie assigns his l<'ase, he divest~
liims(']f of the priYi~y of <·stat<', altllo-;.1gh not of
contract."
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rJ1he assignm('nt transferred and set OV<:'r the leasehold interPst from Mobil Oil to Terry. Terry was an inde1wndent contractor and was not an agent of Mobil nor was
Tvfohil an agent of Terry. Therefore, Mobil Oil effectively
di\·ested itsPlf of snch leasehold interest and no longer
being the kss('e, it had no ownership nor did it possess
any right to exercise the option paragraphs. The attempted Pxercise h~· l\fobil Oil of the option clause was of no
pf'frct for as an indqi('ndent contractor ·with respect to
1\·n:-· and having divested itsplf of its entire estate it no
lollg'!'l' had a kgal relationship Pntitling it to so Pxercise
the option. ln Gill)('rt i·. l'an Kleeck, 132 N.Y. Supp. 2d.
580, the con rt ruled:
"The assignment carried with it the option
to purchase even though there was no express reference in the assignment to the option. An option
to purchase is a covenant running with the land
and the benefit of the covenant passes to an assign('e of the lease without specific mention."
rl1he plaintiff, therefore, seeks a reversal of Judge
Ellett's ruling in this connection and requests a ruling of
this Honorable Court that Mobil could not exercise the
option to renew for the reason that E. E. Terry had been
assigned the right to do so and he was the only person
capable of exercising that right. Such a ruling would
1weessitate a ruling by the Court that the lease was not
renewed and that the plaintiff is entitled to the damage
,jnd;..,r:111Pnt and an immediate order of occupancy.
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POINT V
NO PROPER NOTICE WAS GIVEN BY MOBIL FOR THE
REASON THAT NO ACTUAL NOTICE WAS RECEIVED BY
THE PLAINTIFF NOR WAS NOTICE SENT TO THE ADDRESS DESIGNATED IN THE LEASE.

ri'lJe lJlaintiff in tJii:::; COTIJH'Ction S('Plrn a detPl'lllination
lJy tlii:::; Court that no noticP was gi\·pn and tht>n'fore th1·
lease was not renewed and that the 111aintil'f i:::; <'ntitl('d to
the damage judgment and to an immediate order of oce11pancy. In the alternative, the vlaintiff seeks a ne\\· trial
on this factual i :::;sne if the Court determin0s that tlie
plaintiff may haw received notice.

Respondent contends that with respect to the smnmary jndguwnt granted against her on the issnt> of
whether or not slit> received actual notice ·was im1iroper
for the rPason that the e\·id,·nce of record clearl;,, shmr>
that slw did not recein notice of any option ('X<'reised hy
Pither Mohil Oil or rrPrT>" and tlwreforp thP original leasv
terminatPd hy ib own tPrm:::; on .i\.Iay 1, 19G3. At best a
faetiml dis1:11t<' exists in connection with this point.
Th<' option paragrnpb, hinp; spcciiicall>· conditioned
upon noticP

to

tlw landlon1; lwv<' tlierdore

prop<•rl:: <·xneis<·tl h;: :'.\[oliil Oil
n•c<·i\'l•d t11<•

1:0',iC(' l'<'(jl:i1ul hY
•

~>inc<'

Jl<'\"Pr

h<·Pll

tlH· landlord JH":t·r

tb· ill'O\'isions cont~iJtl·d in
l
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ment on its ovvn printed form, and any interpretation
rnnst, in law, be construed most strictly against Mobil
and in favor of respondent.
The original lease, (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1) proYides as follows:
"17. Lessee may, at its option, by serving
notice of its election so to do at least thirty (30)
<lays prior to the expiration of the term of this
k•asP, renew or extend this lease for a period of
sixty ( 60) months upon the same terms and conditions and at the same rental and payable in the
manner specified in paragraph 1 hereof."
'l'he evidence is not clear with respect to the question
as to whetlwr the lease expired for the reason that the
lrase instrument provides that the lease term would com11wnce upon completion of the necessary improvements to
the real property to allow the lessee to operate it as a
Rrrvice station (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1). It remains
the contention of the plaintiff that this completion occurrt>d in February of 1955 and that the lease should have
commenced at that point, and as such the lease should
have expired in March of 1965; and therefore the notice
which 'Was given was not timely in any eyent. Repondent
C'ontt>nds that this question alone presents a suffici<"nt
factual issne for trial.
the terms of its own printed lease form, lessee
pro\·ich•d an address to which it could safely send legal
B)'

40
notice to the lessor, her successors or assigns, and further
lH'Ovided a method by \Yhich this addr<>ss could he
changed by lessor, succPssor, or assigns, if tlH·y so desired.
The paragraph rt>ads as follows (Plaintiff's Exhibit No.
J):
"10. Anv notice from lessee to lessor mav lw
p;iven by st>n.ding same b~- registered mail· addressed to lessor at 2833 East Millcreek Road,
Salt Lake City 5, Utah, and lessor or his successors or assigns may at any time l»· written noticP
to lessee change the place of giving notice and
after such writtPn notice to lessee by registered
mail, lPss<>e shall send all notices intended for
lessor or his successors or assigns to the addres~
which may lw so indicated."
This notification address has never been changed; therf'fore, the Salt LakP City address clearly typed in paragraph 10 is the place of giving notice under the terms of
the original lease. Any other seryice of notice sufficient
to renew th<> least> must he demonstrated by the lesseP
to havP been actually l'<'<'<'iwd by the lessor 1wrsonally.
rrhe affidm·it of t]H• dt>frndant herl'in <l<•rnonstrates
conelnsi,·ely to tli<> contrary. 'rhe mail n·ct>ipt was signed
hy an indi,·idnal who sig·m·d his nmm• D. :'.\I. -White (R 22)
Tlu• affidavit of plaintiff stat<·d that sh<• had JH'Y<'l' h<'<'ll

notified

b~-

a D. _}[. \\'l1it<> of tlw noti('<' and that D. :\!.

\Yhifr was not an agvnt of h<>I's aml that

i-J1e

was not in

Florida at th" addn,ss \\'h('l'<' D. _}f. \\'Lite rec<·iv<>d the

'
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notice for a period of six months surrounding the time
when it was received by the said D. M. ·white. The defendant had the opportunity had it so chosen to take the
deposition of D. M. White to determine whether or not
that individual actually notified Doris -White Bagely in
contravention of her testimony to that effect; however,
the deff'ndant failed to so depose D. M. White.
That the notice must actually be received by the
lr'ssor is a legal postulate supported in numerous cases,
the following of which is representative:

Blumenthal v. Atkinson, 93 Ark. 252, 124 S:\V. 510.
POINT VI
THE DEFENDANT DID NOT FILE ITS APPEAL IN
SUFFICIENT TIME UNDER APPLICABLE STATUTES.

The plaintiff's action was in the nature of an unlawful detainer action under the Utah Forcible Entry and
Detainer Act which provides in 78-38-11 as follows:
"Time for appeal. - Either party may, within
ten days, appeal from the judgment rendered."
This section was construed in the case of Hunsaker

v. Harris, 109 P.1, 37 Utah 226. The court in that case
stated:
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''The time for taking an appeal in a forcibI~
entry and detainer suit is governed by this section,
which is valid, and th(_• general provision providing
for appeal is not applicahle."
If the Court finds that the 10-day ttppeal time is not
applicable, then of course Rnle 73A applies ·which JH'Ovid(_•s in a1ipliC'ahle part as follows:
" (a) ·when and how taken. 'Vhen an appeal
is permitted from a district C'onrt to the Suprenw
Court, the time within which an appeal may lw
taken shall be one month from the entrv of the
judgment appealed from unless a shorte; time is .
prO\'ided hy law. . . . "
Also pertinent in this regard is Rule 72, the 1wrtinent
_part of which is quoted as follows:
" (a) From final judgments. An amwal may
he taken to the SuprPlllP ,Court from all final judgmPnts, in arrordanre with tlwse n1les; . . . "
']'he question thPn arises as to when the final judg11wnt
was enterPd and whrtlwr or not the appPal was filed within the> approJH'iat<-> tinw ]ll'O\'id<'d hy Pither of the foregoing statutes.
J11<lge Hanson's judgllwnt and deerPe were signed
and enten~d on the 18th dn~- of D(•cemht~r, 19G7 (R. 18S).
']'his was a final judgrn(•nt as to tlH· issnl's of lialiility.

43
1'he only question reserwd for trial was the amount of
damagl'S. Trial was subsequently held and pursuant thereto a judgement was entt•red by Judge Leonard W. Elton
Xovernber 1, 19()8, determining that pursuant to Judge

Hanson's judgment as to liability damages resulted in
the amount of $7,517.00 plns costs of court (R. 213). On
tlw 8th day of' November, 1968, an order was entered by

.Judge Elton allowing costs and disbursements in the
mnount of $18.60 (R. 214). The notice of appeal was
filed

~ ovember

29, 1968, (R. 21 G), which was more than

ten days after Judge Elton's judgment and subsequent

order and was more than thirty days after Jndge Hanf'on's j udgrnent as to liability. Therefore, if Judge Hanson's judgment was a final judgment or if the ten day
appc>al time applies, then the appellant has not filed a
tiind~r

amwal and its appeal should be dismissed.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the respondent respectful!~-

prays this Court to issue its order:

1.

Dismissing the appeal for the reason that the

noticP of appeal ·was not timely filed.
2.

In the alternative, to sustain the summary judg-

In<'nt of Judge Hanson, or
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3. In the alternative, to reverse the summary judgment of Judge Ellett and enter judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, or

4. In the alternative, remand the case for a new
trial on all issues.
Respectfully submitted,

SUMMERHAYS, KLINGLE & CORNE
1010 University Club Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for Respondent and
Cross-Appellant Doris White Bagley

